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The so-called ‘energy revolution’ has been one of the priority reforms in the agenda of Presi-
dent Xi Jinping. It is one part of the deep restructuring of the Chinese economy, and represents 
a move away from the investment-based model. The slowdown of economic growth and the 
rising importance of the problem of environmental pollution have led to a redefinition of the 
role of coal in Chinese economic policy. The share of coal in energy consumption is expected to 
decrease gradually, and coal-fired power plants are expected to lose importance and give gro-
und to renewable and nuclear energy. This trend is expected to be boosted by the restructuring 
and reduction of heavy industry which the government intends to carry out. The situation of 
the Chinese coal sector will also change as a result of the ongoing price reform, which aims to 
reduce the level of energy intensity and increase the efficiency of the sector’s operations by 
introducing deregulation in the field of electricity distribution and transmission.
The energy sector reform and structural changes in the economy have led to a decrease in 
the consumption of coal for the first time in many years. However, in contrast to the reforms 
announced in 2014, the year 2015 did not halt the rapid expansion of the production capacity 
of coal-fired power plants. Due to the decentralisation of the decision-making process, within 
twelve months the provincial governments issued permits for the construction of new coal-fi-
red units with a total capacity of 169 GW, which is over three times more than the year before. 
This rapid increase was a result of efforts by local authorities to stimulate short-term economic 
growth, and was possible due to ineffective regulations which encouraged energy companies 
to increase their investment activity. If all the ongoing and planned projects were implemen-
ted, the capacity of Chinese coal-fired power plants would almost double, which could put an 
end to the reform of the Chinese energy sector. In an attempt to stop this ‘counter-revolution’, 
in March 2016 the central government carried out a reform to re-centralise the process and halt 
the construction of coal-fired plants in 15 provinces until 2017.
Developments in the Chinese coal sector have revealed a series of fundamental challenges to 
the changes in China’s economic model. The inert planning system has made it impossible to 
quickly adjust the number of new power plants to the reduced pace of economic growth, which 
in effect has led to a power surplus. The decentralisation of the decision-making process has 
revealed a significant conflict of interest between the central government and the provinces, 
and the flawed regulations resulted in energy companies allocating resources ineffectively, ulti-
mately causing an investment bubble. When the central government regained control of the si-
tuation, it created a series of temporary tools to limit the expansion of the coal sector. However, 
no systemic reforms necessary to change the economic model were carried out.
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Challenges to the Chinese coal sector
The price paid for access to relatively cheap en-
ergy generated by burning coal, which has been 
one of the pillars of China’s economic develop-
ment in the last 30 years, was the deep degrada-
tion of the natural environment. The model for 
stimulating the economy applied after the 2008 
economic crisis, which involved major invest-
ments in infrastructure and industrial production 
capacity, has magnified the existing problems 
and led to an increase in the consumption of 
coal, from around 3 billion tonnes in 2008 to over 
4.2 billion tonnes in 20131. This has translated into 
increased pollution emissions, and fuelled the de-
bate in China on the negative impact of coal on 
air quality. In some Chinese cities the concentra-
tion of PM 2.52 toxic particles began to exceed the 
World Health Organisation limits by several hun-
dred per cent. This has caused a wave of intense 
criticism towards the state’s environmental policy, 
as well as towards certain interest groups associ-
ated with the industry, for example metallurgical 
conglomerates and coal-fired plant operators3. 
This criticism has been particularly active on the 
Chinese internet. Proposals for the construction 
of new coal-fired units caused massive street pro-
tests, for example in the provinces of Guangdong, 
Hunan and Inner Mongolia. The scale of the pollu-
tion and the animated street protests have put the 
government in Beijing under pressure and forced 
the Chinese leadership to declare a ‘war on pollu-
tion’. The transformation towards a ‘green econo-
my’ has been considered a political priority. It has 
influenced the shape of the wide-ranging reform 
of the energy sector announced by the Chinese 
leadership, because it gave priority to renewable 
energy sources and nuclear energy.
1 The quoted data take into account a correction of his-
torical data made by China’s statistical office in 2015, 
http://www.theenergycollective.com/hao-tan/2292551/
revision-china-s-energy-and-coal-consumption-da-
ta-preliminary-analysis
2 These are particles of a diameter of around 2.5 μm, 
which are considered to be particularly carcinogenic.
3 This was the message of a documentary which was pub-
lished online at the beginning of 2015, entitled Under the 
Dome (Qiongding zhixia). It was filmed by a former CCTV 
reporter. Over a couple of days, it was played around 300 
million times before it was censored and removed.
The second fundamental challenge to the 
Chinese coal sector involves the slowdown of 
China’s GDP, which President Xi Jinping referred 
to in 2014 as “the new normal” (xin chang-
tai). The exhaustion of the investment-based 
growth model has brought about the ongoing 
structural transformation of the Chinese econo-
my, which the Chinese authorities are trying to 
control and facilitate. The slowdown observed 
in the construction and industrial production 
sectors, which account for 72%4 of electricity 
consumption, combined with the reduction of 
production surplus in the steel production in-
dustry, which is the main recipient of coal, have 
caused a slump in demand for coal. Until 2013 
the consumption of coal had been growing 
steadily for over a decade, whereas in 2014 it 
decreased by 2.9%5. 2015 saw an even great-
er decrease (by 3.7%), which was followed by 
a 3.3% reduction in the volume of coal pro-
duced by the mining sector6. Excessive invest-
ments combined with the economic slowdown 
have led to excess production capacity in the 
Chinese coal mining sector, currently estimat-
ed at 5.7 billion tonnes annually7, of which only 
around 3.75 billion tonnes was used in 2015.
The direction of the reforms set by the Chi-
nese government seems to suggest that 2013 
saw a historic peak in the production and con-
sumption of coal. Continued decline in the con-
sumption of coal will be facilitated by a govern-
ment-supported move from the ‘old economy’, 
heavy industry and construction investments, 
4 Data for 2015, CNPC Economics & Research Institute.
5 http: // f inance.sina.com.cn/money/future/futures-
nyzx/20150227/080921604681.shtml
6 http://www.lwzb.gov.cn/pub/gjtjlwzb/sjyfx /201605/
t20160525_2782.html
7 http://www.ce.cn/xwzx /gnsz /gdxw/201601/12/t20 
160112_8203711.shtml
Departure from the investment-based mod-
el, together with the mounting problem 
of air pollution, has caused a redefinition 
of the role of coal in the Chinese economy.
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towards an economic model based on the less 
energy-consuming service sector, high tech-
nologies and high added-value production. 
Reduction of the present surplus in heavy indus-
try has been one of the main goals of the so-
called supply side reform (gongyingce gaige), 
which has been considered an economic poli-
cy priority. In line with the plan announced by 
the government in February 20168, China’s coal 
production capacity is to be reduced by 500 
million tonnes by 20209, as well as by 100–150 
million tonnes10 in the steel production indus-
try, which has been a major coal consumer. 
Foundations of China’s transformation 
towards the green economy
Due to the new challenges involving environ-
mental pollution and structural changes in the 
Chinese economy, reforms of the energy sector 
have become a priority for the Chinese leader-
ship and President Xi Jinping himself. The main 
aims of the Chinese ‘energy revolution’ include 
reducing the share of fossil fuels in the energy 
mix and boosting the economy’s energy effi-
ciency. In 2014, the goal was set for the share 
of non-fossil fuels to reach 15% of the country’s 
entire energy consumption by 2020. This would 
require a series of transformations in the elec-
tricity generation sector and a quick develop-
ment of capacity of hydroelectric, nuclear and 
8 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/05/con-
tent_5039686.htm
9 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-05/
china-puts-1-billion-tons-of-coal-capacity-on-chop-
ping-block
10 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/con-
tent_5039353.htm
solar power stations, as well as for wind farms 
to generate 708 GW11 by 2020 (from the pres-
ent 517 GW)12. The increased share of non-fos-
sil fuels in the energy mix is associated with 
a limitation on the development of China’s ther-
mal power generation sector, which at present 
is based almost exclusively on coal13; current-
ly, this generates 74.6% of China’s electricity. 
According to estimates by Greenpeace, for the 
goals defined for 2020 to be reached, this pro-
portion would have to be reduced to 65-67%14. 
Another aim of China’s ‘energy revolution’ is to re-
duce the energy intensity of the Chinese economy 
and increase the efficiency of electricity genera-
tion. The setting of an upper limit for total pow-
er consumption in China in 2016 was an event 
without precedent; in 2020 it should not exceed 
5 billion tonnes of coal equivalent (the present 
figure is 4.3 billion)15. This decision is intended to 
encourage investments in energy-efficient tech-
nologies. At the same time, it is tantamount to 
a reduction of the potential for expanding elec-
tricity generation capacity. In the context of the 
energy mix reform, this will affect the coal ener-
gy sector to the greatest extent. Due to techno-
logical advancement and the short operational 
record of Chinese coal-fired power plants, the 
efficiency of power generation by way of burn-
ing coal is relatively high in China compared with 
the global average. Despite this, the Chinese 
government plans to continue to modernise the 
sector’s production capacity and develop tech-
nologies necessary to increase the average effi-
ciency of power generation to reach the propor-
tion of less than 300 grams of coal per one kWh 
11 In line with strategies adopted by the government, 
this level is to be reached in 2020; http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/content/2014-11/19/content_9222.htm
12 http://info.zjtcn.com/news/green/2016/0219/619418.html
13 Chinese statistics exclusively quote figures referring to 
the total production of electricity by the entire thermal 
energy sector, including both gas-fired and coal-fired 
stations. In 2015, the share of gas in China’s energy mix 
was a mere 6%.
14 http://energydesk.greenpeace.org/2014/12/17/china-
coal-peak-iea-missed/
15 http://energy.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0426/c71661-
28303860.html
China’s ‘energy revolution’ gives priority to 
nuclear and renewable energy, and is also 
expected to reduce the economy’s energy 
intensity. This limits the potential for the 
development of the coal energy industry.
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and reduce the scale of emission of pollutants16.
As part of the reform intended to boost the ef-
ficiency of operations in the coal energy sector, 
the deregulation of prices of energy generation 
and transmission is planned. This is intended to 
improve the allocation of resources and ration-
alise the investments in this sector, as it is inde-
pendent of market fluctuations caused by price 
changes. The government’s plans include liberal-
ising the entire supply chain comprising electrici-
ty generation, transmission and sale. At present, 
pilot projects involving the reduction of profit 
margins applied by transmission companies (for 
example in Shenzhen) are being implemented. 
Changes are being introduced as regards the 
principles of obtaining access to the power grid, 
which tend to prefer coal over renewable energy 
sources. The final element of the reform involves 
the liberalisation of retail energy prices. At pres-
ent, the prices of electricity transmission and dis-
tribution are being set by state agencies.
In 2012, a dual system of setting coal prices 
was abandoned. Under this system, electricity 
generating companies had access to cheaper 
coal, whose price had been set by way of ne-
gotiations between the mining sector and the 
energy production sector under supervision 
from the state. In previous years, the scope of 
these agreements had been gradually reduced. 
Control by the state has recently been discon-
tinued, as a result of which the power genera-
tion sector has begun to purchase coal at mar-
ket prices. This reform was facilitated by low 
coal prices, which enabled the energy sector to 
maintain its profitability.
Combating the ‘coal counter-revolution’
The turn in the Chinese coal energy sector an-
nounced by the Chinese leadership in 2014, 
which came as a consequence of the ‘energy 
revolution’, was combined with the partial de-
centralisation of the procedure for granting ap-
provals for the construction of new coal-fired 
16 http://www.nea.gov.cn/2014-09/28/c_133679621.htm
units. In October 2014, the National Develop-
ment and Reform Council (NDRC) delegated the 
task of approving new projects to its counter-
parts in specific provinces, whereas in March 
2015 a similar change was made regarding 
the procedure of the Ministry for Environmen-
tal Protection issuing environmental permits. 
The aim of the reform was to make the proce-
dure more flexible, and to adjust the number of 
approvals to local environmental situation and 
to the changes in the demand for electricity. In 
contrast to expectations, decentralisation has 
resulted in a significant increase in the number 
of new coal projects. According to Greenpeace, 
in 2015 environmental approvals were issued for 
169 GW of new capacity, which was a three-fold 
increase compared with 2014. The NDRC’s del-
egation of competences regarding the issuing 
of building permits to relevant offices in specific 
provinces has brought a similar result – the av-
erage capacity of projects approved each week 
increased from 4 GW to 10 GW17.
If all the coal-fired units which had been sub-
mitted for approval in recent years were actu-
ally constructed, this would cause a series of 
developments which would be highly unfa-
vourable for the central government. At the 
beginning of 2016, around 190 GW of new ca-
pacity was already under construction, which 
means that the completion of all the currently 
implemented and planned projects would be 
17 Over nine months (from January to September 2014) the 
total capacity of new coal-fired units approved by the cen-
tral NDRC was slightly above 35 GW (32 approvals). Due to 
the decentralisation of the decision-making process, over 
the next 15 months provincial bodies approved the con-
struction of units with up to 151 GW of new capacity (149 
approvals). Source: CoalSwarm Global Plant Coal Tracker.
The announced liberalisation of electrici-
ty transmission and sale prices is intend-
ed to contribute to the improvement of the 
quality of investments in the Chinese en-
ergy sector.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 220
tantamount to a doubling of the capacity of 
China’s coal-fired units, which in turn would 
put an end to the Chinese ‘energy revolution’. 
In January 2016, the total capacity of all new 
coal-fired power plants undergoing the ap-
proval process was a staggering 515 GW18. 
The rapid increase in the number of new pro-
jects observed in 2015 was accompanied by an 
inert planning process and a lengthy procedure 
for granting approvals. This, in turn, has caused 
a massive accumulation of projects submitted 
in previous years which were based on demand 
forecasts prepared before the period of eco-
nomic slowdown. The increase in the number 
of approvals granted in previous years, espe-
cially in western provinces, was partly due to 
the plan to relocate power plants to less dense-
ly populated areas19. 
The implementation of planned coal projects 
would also cause a significant rise in the supply 
of electricity obtained from coal, which in turn 
would challenge the profitability of this sector. 
In a situation of decreased use of the present ca-
pacity and insignificant increase in the demand 
for electricity, investments in new units would 
cause a continued drop in the utilisation rate of 
the existing infrastructure and an increased risk 
18 The process of granting approvals has several stages: the 
quoted number of approvals includes announced projects 
(246 GW), projects with preliminary approval (215 GW) 
and projects with final approval (54 GW). Considering 
the fact that in 2010-2015 only 164 GW of projects which 
were at the preliminary stage of approval were cancelled, it 
should be expected that most of them will be implement-
ed. Source: CoalSwarm Global Plant Coal Tracker.
19 This has influenced the geographical distribution of new 
projects; 50% of new projects were located in western 
provinces, although at present these provinces account 
for a mere 28% of the existing capacity. 
of insolvency across the entire energy sector. 
This problem is all the more urgent because the 
energy sector is dominated by state-controlled 
companies which face massive debt. Anoth-
er negative consequence of the ‘counter-rev-
olution’ in the Chinese coal energy sector has 
been the increased risk of street protests; for 
example in August 2015, around 10,000 people 
took part in a rally against the construction of 
a power plant in Heyuan in Guangdong prov-
ince. Any significant expansion of the capacity 
would also enable certain interest groups asso-
ciated with the coal sector to obtain – by faits 
accomplis – strong arguments in favour of sav-
ing the sector, most likely to the detriment of 
renewable and nuclear energy. 
At the beginning of 2016, the Chinese authori-
ties decided to curb the energy ‘counter-revolu-
tion’. In March, the National Development and 
Reform Council announced a plan to radically 
limit the construction of coal-fired units, ac-
cording to the slogan ‘suspend, block, delay’20. 
The key element of the plan was the administra-
tive decision to suspend the process of issuing 
permits for the construction of new units un-
til the end of 2017, and to suspend all projects 
which have already been approved but whose 
construction has not yet been launched. The 
projects which are being implemented are to 
be delayed. The restrictions cover 15 selected 
provinces and regions in which an oversupply 
of electricity has been observed. A decision was 
also made to create a central control mecha-
nism to make the launch of future projects (in-
cluding obtaining funds for the investments) 
dependent on their impact on the environment 
and the state of water resources, on business 
profitability and on local demand situation. 
Central coordination of provincial plans on the 
development of the energy sector is to be im-
proved, with particular emphasis placed on sat-
isfying demand by developing renewable sourc-
es of energy and increasing the efficiency of 
the present coal-fired units. Another important 
20 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201604/t20160425 
_798979.html
Decentralisation of the process of issuing 
approvals for the construction of coal-
fired power stations has caused a rapid 
increase in the number of new projects. 
Their implementation would put an end to 
China’s policy of ‘exit from coal’.
6OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 220
point is the development of the network for the 
transmission of energy from provinces with sur-
plus power to areas in which there is a deficit. 
Chinese leaders have announced a plan to ap-
ply ‘natural selection’ mechanisms to eliminate 
low-efficiency coal-fired power plants with be-
low 3 GW capacity which have been operating 
for more than 20–25 years. Due to the central 
government’s determination and the scale of 
disobedience at the local level, sanctions have 
been announced regarding coal projects which 
are being implemented without formal approv-
al. The individuals responsible will be penalised, 
details of their activity will be publicised and the 
projects will immediately be suspended – in ex-
treme cases by cutting them off from funding 
and depriving them of access to the power grid.
Main challenges to China’s economic 
reforms
Developments in the Chinese coal sector have 
revealed a series of fundamental challenges 
faced by China’s leaders in the process of im-
plementing deep economic reforms. Firstly, 
the economic slowdown, which translates into 
a much lower than expected increase in de-
mand for electricity, has revealed the inertia of 
the Chinese planning system. The unexpected 
slump has disturbed the course of the planned 
expansion of the capacity of coal-fired power 
plants, which had been prepared for many years 
ahead, leading to a production surplus and 
a decreased level of infrastructure use. The log-
ic behind the Chinese decentralisation process, 
which is an important element of the series 
of reforms, was based on delegating compe-
tences to provincial governments so that local 
knowledge resources could be used to respond 
better to local needs. However, one of the con-
sequences of decentralising procedures for is-
suing permits to construct new power plants 
involves the state losing control of the sector. 
This was because the process has revealed 
a major conflict of interests between the cen-
tral governments and the provinces. 
After gaining control of the expansion of the 
coal sector, the provincial governments did not 
proceed to implement the centrally-planned 
energy revolution; instead they began to take 
advantage of their new competences to tem-
porarily stimulate the sector’s operations. This 
happened mainly in those regions with the 
biggest share of coal-related sectors in their 
GDP, for example Shanxi, Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia (around 40% of new capacity). Par-
adoxically, in part these were the areas which 
make up the Chinese ‘rust belt’, and which are 
the main target of the reforms devised by the 
government – they were the most affected by 
the slowdown in the steel production industry 
and the mining industry and by degradation 
of the environment. New investments in coal- 
-fired units have become a tool to temporarily 
stimulate local economies and fight rising un-
employment; this came as continuation of the 
growth model based on major infrastructural 
investments, which began to be applied after 
2009. In some areas, this model has caused 
a spiral of debt for local governments and 
companies associated with them; for example, 
at the beginning of 2016 the Shanxi province, 
China’s main coal producer, announced that 
as many as 103 of its districts were at risk of 
becoming insolvent21. Activities by local offi-
cials can partly be explained by their intention 
to achieve the highest possible GDP ratios, as 
this was what the individual promotion of party 
members within the structures of the Commu-
nist Party of China usually depended on. 
The investment bubble in the coal energy sector 
has also revealed the consequences of distor-
21 http://www.haijiangzx.com/2016/0104/610365.shtml
The ‘coal counter-revolution’ has revealed 
the divergence in the interests pursued by 
central bodies and by provincial govern-
ments and state-controlled companies.
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tions resulting from inefficient market regula-
tion which enabled the producers of coal-based 
energy to earn outstanding profits. Liberalising 
coal prices at a moment when they were fall-
ing rapidly has significantly reduced the cost of 
power generation. Combined with the concur-
rent maintenance of administrative regulation 
mechanisms regarding electricity prices, this 
has made Chinese coal-fired power plants ex-
ceptionally profitable. The profit margin varies 
in specific provinces, however; in certain areas 
the return on capital invested in the construc-
tion of new coal-fired power plants was as high 
as 30%, and in some cases, investment outlays 
were returned after just three years22. This sit-
uation has mainly benefited the five biggest 
state-controlled companies, which together 
have a 60% market share. It was also facilitat-
ed by China’s system of granting access to the 
power grid, which guarantees the opportunity 
to sell power generated by new units. This is 
why the sector recorded extraordinary profits, 
despite the fact that China’s annual average uti-
lisation rate of thermal power plants has been 
on the wane23. This means that the newly con-
nected coal-fired units (the total increase in ca-
pacity was around 245 GW in 2011-201524) were 
not fully used; moreover, they generated excess 
22 http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001067324?full=y
23 In 2015, the ratio was a mere 4329 hours, which 
is around 49%, whereas in 2011 it was over 60%. 
This data refers to power plants with a capacity of 
more than 600 MW, http://www.cec.org.cn/yaowen-
kuaidi/2016-01-29/148607.html
24 CoalSwarm Global Plant Coal Tracker
supply which limited the level of exploitation of 
the existing production capacity. 
The example of the coal sector shows that the 
success of China’s economic reforms depends 
mainly on the central government’s ability to 
control the interest groups which are interest-
ed in maintaining the status quo. The strong 
reaction to problems which emerged at the 
beginning of the process of ‘abandoning’ coal, 
combined with evident progress in expanding 
the production capacity of power plants using 
renewable energy sources and nuclear power 
stations, are proof of the central government’s 
determination to maintain the course of Chi-
na’s ‘energy revolution’. The actions launched 
in March 2016, including the centralisation of 
the process for issuing approvals, seem to offer 
adequate tools to break the resistance of the 
local authorities and energy sector companies, 
even though their nature is temporary. The re-
form’s success will largely depend on whether 
systemic solutions will be implemented, includ-
ing ones which would change the system of in-
centives for local governments, together with 
mechanisms to compensate for losses resulting 
from structural economic changes in the most 
sensitive regions25 and improve the practice of 
capital allocation in regulated sectors.
25 The key question involves the risk of structural unemploy-
ment which would result from lay-offs in the coal sector. 
The central government has announced a training pro-
gramme for employees of closed companies, targeting 
two million individuals. Attempts are being made to find 
a systemic solution to the problem, for example in the form 
of financing training activities from funds obtained from 
profit margins applied by energy transmission companies. 
